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Abstract
In addition to the common analysis of the Kauﬀman NK model where
the value of K and the structure of interaction is given, the aim of this
paper is to study what would be the values of these two parameters if they
were endogenized. Thus, a model is proposed where firms and business
schools coordinate to search for high peaks in their respective landscapes
using evolutionary algorithms. The main result coming out from the anal-
ysis of the model is that agents, using evolutionary algorithms, attempt
to simplify the problems of coordination and this, over time, produces
the existence in the economy of agents using many diﬀerent strategies.
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INTRODUCTION
Coming from biology and physics, during the last years, the theory of land-
scapes has been used as a complement to study features of evolutionary and
adaptive systems1. The basic idea is that given a set of hypothesis about the
evolutive mechanisms of agents, landscape theory provides a means to cre-
ate plausible representations of realities with desirable properties2 to test the
behavior of those mechanisms under diﬀerent conditions.
Reality is artificially represented using landscapes and agents go through it,
searching for high peaks. Landscape theory has developed tools that allows the
design of realities with diﬀerent features. One of the key feature of a landscape
is how much information about the highest peak gives to an agent that is in
a specific position. If the landscape is smooth an agent can easily distinguish
where the highest peak is, whereas in rough landscapes the information about
the peaks is not easily obtained and agents have to develop search strategies
to reach it. The evolutionary skills required to find the highest peak will, of
course, be a function, so to speak, of the topography of the landscape.
Thus, given a landscape together with the specification of the evolutionary
characteristic of an agent it is possible to study the performance of either a
single or a population of agents. Moreover it is possible to explore the same
characteristics on landscapes with diﬀerent level of roughness. On the other
1At times the systems is an agent with a complex structure evolving on the landscape or
a population of agents that interact through any evolutionay process.
2Desirable properties about; autocorrelation between solutions, number of local optimas
and average number of improvements in a random search. See (3) and (6).
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hand, there is nothing that prevents the search to go the other way around;
given evolutionary characteristics, what is the level of roughness selected. In-
deed this opposite way is the one to be followed in this work.
Complementary to the analysis of the computational eﬃciency of an insti-
tution to solve a well defined economic problem, see Scarf (1990) [(7)] or Holm
(2003), the concern in this paper is how an institution selects the complexity of
the problem. In order to attain this, some parsimony is required in the model
of the institution and the problem.
On one hand, the institution is represented by two evolutionary algorithm,
i.e. genetic algorithm, that coordinate the search in the configurational space
defined by the problem and on the other hand, theNK landscape introduced by
Kauﬀman, [(2), (3)] is an appropiate object to represent a problem, since using
one parameter it is possible to adjust its level of roughness. The roughness of
the landscape is used as a proxy of the complexity of the problem.
Levinthal [(4)] uses NK models to show that organizations with a high level
of interaction within their departments are more likely to show persistence of
organizational structure because in such a landscape, i.e. rugged landscapes,
there are many local peaks and firms will see these peaks as illusionary traps.
Moreover a high level of interaction within departments, i.e. rugged land-
scapes, produces in the industry the presence of many organizational models
distributed thorough multiple local peaks.
Departing from the idea of representing human organization as biological
entities Rivkin and Siggelkow [(5)] show that the main features of hierarchical
human organizations (delegation, interdependencies and diﬀerent local incen-
3
tives) may very well come to rest at a "sticking point" that is not a local
optimum on the fitness landscape of the overall organization.
The number and nature of the interaction among the departments settle how
complicated is for an organization to search for the highest peak. In all the
previous cases both parameters are exogenously given. The aim of this paper
is to study how these features are selected in the case in which firms use a basic
set of evolutionary operators to search through the landscapes.
In the model there are external consultancy agencies, let us call them ‘schools’,
in analogy with ‘business schools acting as consultants’, that make recommen-
dations about the network of links among departments in a firm. A simple ex-
ample of these links could be, for instance, the recommendation says whether
the department of marketing before of making decisions have to organize a
meeting with the departments of production, finance and human resources, i.e.
there are three links. Firms using the recommendation of the schools, search
in the reality that is represented by landscapes, the highest fitness peaks on
a landscape. Firms that obtain low fitness are periodically replaced by new
entrants that select new and alternative recommendations to explore reality.
In turn, the success of the firm is the success of the school. In other words
schools whose recommendations produce low fitness will be also replaced by
new schools that will make new recommendations. As consequence of this evo-
lutionary process a set of school with optimal recommendations remain always
in the industry3. Thus, the goal of this paper is translated into the study of
3Notice that there is no direct interaction between the firms, so that is possible to focus
just in the searching features of the school recomendation.
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the main features of the recommendations coming from the optimal schools.
All the mechanisms of exploration that schools and firms have are evolutive
in the sense that they use three operators; mutations, selection and recombi-
nation to search for the highest peak in the reality, represented by the relevant
landscape.
The paper is developed as follows; in section 2 the model will be presented
showing in detail the time-line of the simulation together with the landscape of
the firms and schools. In section 3, some results about the time complexity of
the NK landscape model are presented. Next, in section 4, the simulations will
be presented together with the results obtained and, finally, some concluding
notes are pieced together in section 5.
MODEL
There is a set of schools Σ that produce recommendations about how the
departments within a firm have to be organized. For every school σ ∈ Σ, there
is a set of firms Sσ that adopt the model of organization that the school recom-
mends. Firms using the recommendation of the school σ, search in the reality,
i.e., landscapes, in order to obtain high peaks. The school recommendations
constrains the search capacities of the firms.
Reality is represented with a landscape with random peaks where the agents4,
i.e. firms and schools, have to search for high values. It is assumed that there
are no interfirm interactions even when diﬀerent firms may be using identical
recommendations from the same schools nor between firms using recommen-
4More details about how reality is represented are below.
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dations of diﬀerent schools. All of them search independently for the highest
peak in the same representation of reality.
Periodically firms using recommendations that produce low fitness are re-
moved together with the respective school. Schools are replaced by a new one
that produce a new set of recommendations, to a new set of firms, which over
time will use them to explore the postulated representation of reality.
At the end of this iterative process it is expected that a kind of stability will
be achieved in that there will remin an ’unremoved’ set of schools that would
have survived the evolutionary winnowing process. They constitute the top
schools whose recommendations represent the best model of organization.
Simulation time-line
The basic time-line of this sequential system is the following,
1. The unique Contribution Table Ω to create the landscape that represents
the Reality during the simulation is created.
2. The initial population of schools Σ, of size |Σ| , is created.
3. For every school σ ⊂ Σ a population of |S| firms is created to use the
recommendation of the school. In the simulation at this step there are
|Σ| |S| firms.
4. Firms using the recommendation coming from their respective schools
evolve during τ periods in the landscape according to the specification
that will be explained below.
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5. Schools according to the results obtained by the firms using their recom-
mendation in step 4 evolve applying the same genetic operators as the
firms.
6. Repeat steps 3, 4 and 5 during T periods.
At the end of these 6 steps there is a set of schools Σ∗, i.e. the recommen-
dations of the schools, that survived the whole evolutionary process.
The properties of this well fitted set of schools |Σ∗| give information about
the characteristics of the recommendation that are preferred by the firms.
In order to explain in greater detail the evolutionary processes running in
steps 4 and 5 the definition of a landscape will, now, be introduced together
with the particular instance of the landscapes of firms and schools.
According to Reidys and Stadler [(6)] a landscape Λ is defined by the triple
(X,χ, f) where;
X is the configurations space
χ represents a notion of nearness, distance or accessibility on X; and
f is a fitness function f : X → R.
In what follows all these objects will be described for firms and schools.
Firms’ Landscape
A firm is composed by a set of N departments, for instance Marketing,
Finance, Production, etc... In this extremely simple version of the behav-
ior of firms, it is assumed that every department has two available strategies
r = {0, 1}. Thus, a firm will be represented by a string of N bits that specify
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the strategy that every department has adopted. This implies that the config-
uration space XS , that represents the set of possible combination of strategies
that firms can adopt has size |XS | = 2N .
According to the combination of strategies adopted by the department of the
firms, every firm obtains a fitness which is computed averaging the contribution
that every department make to the whole firm.
The contribution that a department i makes is a function of the strategy
selected by the department itself, the recommendation σi ⊂ σ ∈ Σ that the
firm is using and the strategies selected by the departments to which i is linked
according to the recommendation σi.
A recommendation of a school σ is a set of specification given to every
department in a firm describing the links among all the departments.
Thus, in a sense, it is possible to represent one recommendation as a binary
matrix of size N ×N where every row represent the interrelationship between
the department in the row and the others.
For the sake of exposition, suppose that firms have N = 8 departments
and that there exist two schools, the Adjacent and the Random schools. Each
school has its characteristic recommendation, the Adjacent school recommends
that departments have to be linked with the departments that are adjacent,
i.e. every firm link to 2 other departments, whereas the random school rec-
ommends that departments have to be randomly linked to each other without
any specification about the number of departments to which they are being
connected.
In the figure 1 there are two examples of the recommendation of the schools.
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Fig. 1. Example of school recomendations
For instance, considering that a black cell means ’to be linked with’, the rec-
ommendation to the department number one from the Adjacent school is to
link with department 2 and 85. On the other hand, the recommendation to
the department number one coming from the Random school is to be link with
department 3 and 5.
Thus, given the set of the strategies adopted by every department, {1, 0},
and the school recommendation that firms adopt, it is possible to compute the
contribution of every department i to the firm.
Formally the fitness for a firm which adopts the recommendation σ and
strategy s is given by
f (σ, s) =
1
N
NX
i=1
c (σi, s)
5Notice that the department is linked with itself.
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where σi is the recommendation that the school σ gives to the department
i, s is the set of strategies that the all the departments within a firm made
and c represents the contribution to the fitness that every department provides
according to the recommendation σi.
The contribution table Ω is a list of 2N pseudo-random numbers uniformly
distributed in (0, 1) . Thus, given the strategy selected by the departments and
the set of links specified by the recommendation, the index p is computed
with 1 < p < 2N . The function c uses the index to collect the corresponding
pseudo-random number from the list Ω.
For the sake of exposition an example is developed. Suppose that a firm has
N = 8 departments which have the strategies {1, 0, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1} and that the
firm adopt the recommendation σ. Moreover suppose that the recommendation
for the department 2 is the following σ2 = {1, 2, 3} 6. The index p in this case is
the decimal number that can be computed according to the current strategies
of the departments 1, 2 and 3. This is p = (100)b = 4, where the notation
(.)b has been used to express that the number inside the brackets is binary.
Thus the contribution of the department 2 is the pseudo-random number in
the position 4 in the list Ω.
Up to now the configurational space XS and the fitness function fS have
been explained for the landscape of the firms, ΛS. Now it has to be explained
how firms move through the configurational space. In other words, according
to the definition of landscape adopted, it is necessary to explain χs :
6Notice that this is the recomendation that the school Adjancents gives in figure 1, and
that firm 2 it has to be included in the list of links.
10
The set χs is composed by three evolutionary operators; selection, recombi-
nation and mutation7.
Thus, the evolution explained in step 4 of the time-line simulations run as
follows;
1. For every recommendation σ of a school, a fixed population of |S| firms
with N departments is created. Besides, every department selects, ini-
tially, a random strategy.
2. The fitness value of every firm in the |Σ| groups is computed according
to the recommendation and the strategies adopted by the departments.
3. The operator of selection is applied to every population of firms, obtain-
ing |Σ| subsets of firms which have higher fitnesses within every popula-
tion of firms.
4. In any population of firms, using the selected population of firms, the
crossover operator is applied in order to obtain again the populations of
|S| firms.
5. Over this new population the mutation operator is applied giving place
to the new set of firms.
6. Go back to step 2 for τ periods.
Thus, for every school a firms using this genetic algorithm evolves through
the configurational space.
7These operators are the three most used in Genetic Algorithms literature.
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Schools Landscape
During the description of the landscape of the firms ΛS, the school recom-
mendation has been explained.
Thus, we are able now to explain the configuration space in the schools
landscape. Indeed assuming that firms have N departments and that schools
have to produce recommendations about the link that every department has
to have, the size of one school recommendation is N2.
Given that a recommendation specifies just whether one department is con-
nected or not with the other departments, it is necessary that just 10s and 00s to
specify this. Thus, the size of the space configuration XΣ for the school is 2N
2
.
Notice that the configuration space for schools is bigger than the configuration
space of the firms.
The fitness that one school σ obtains is computed as the mean of the fitness
that firms that have been using its recommendations obtained. In other words,
f =
1
|S|
|S|X
j=1
Cj (1)
where |S| is the number of firms and Cj is the fitness that firm j obtains.
The schools move through the configuration space applying also the same
evolutionary operators than firms use; selection, recombination and mutation.
For the sake of clarity the sequence in the application of the operators is
shown;
1. The initial population of |Σ| schools is created with their recommenda-
tions randomly generated.
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2. Firms evolve in their landscape and according to this, the fitness value
of the schools is computed using 1.
3. Applying the operator of selection a proportion p of the best schools is
obtained from the current Σ population.
4. Using the subpopulation obtained in step 3 and applying the operator of
recombination the population of size |Σ| is recovered.
5. Over the new population of schools the mutation operator is applied.
6. Repeat step 2 to 5 during T periods.
COMPUTATIONAL COMPLEXITY
Given the specification of both landscapes ΛS and ΛΣ it is possible to be
more precise about the concept of complexity used in the paper.
Every recommendation produces a variation of the NK-Models proposed by
Kauﬀman (2) in the landscape of firms, ΛS. Indeed in the case of the Adjacent
schools of figure 1, firms adopting its recommendation are searching through
the NK model with adjacencies where N = 8 and K = 3.
As described by Kauﬀman (3), recommendations where K is low, i.e. few
interrelationship among the departments, produce smooth landscapes that gave
to firms greater chances of reaching the highest peak. On the other hand,
when the value of K is close to N meaning that there is high interdependency
among the departments and the change in one of them will impact all the other
departments, the complexity of the space in which firms are searching for the
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highest peak is greater.
The NK model has been studied using diﬀerent configurations, (see (2), (3)
and (6) for more details). Keeping the value ofK fixed two main variation have
been proposed; the adjacent and the random configurations. In the adjacent
model the interrelationship of one department is with its K closer neighbors
whereas in the random model one department is linked toK other departments
randomly picked. Rugged landscapes will make the work of the optimizer
harder.
The complexity in this paper is determined by the level of diﬃculties that
firms have in finding out the optimal values in reality. The level of diﬃculty
that a firm has in order to find out optimal values is given by the school
recommendations. Notice that, as previously explained, a recommendation
specifies the value ofK for every department and the specific interrelationships
between the departments.
It is possible to use some guides coming from the literature that give insights
about the computational complexity of a reduced set of NK landscapes.
A landscape is assigned to the NP (nondeterministic polynomial time) class
if it is verifiable in polynomial time by a nondeterministic Turing machine8.A
P -problem, whose solution time is bounded by a polynomial, is always also
NP . If a problem is known to be NP , and a solution to the problem is
somehow known, then demonstrating the correctness of the solution can always
8A nondeterministc Turing machine is a parallel Turing machine which can take many
computational paths simultaneously, with the restriction that the parallel Turing machines
cannot communicate.
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be reduced to a single P (polynomial time) verification. If P and NP are not
equivalent, then the solution of NP -problems requires (in the worst case) an
exhaustive search. The P = NP , or, alternatively, P 6= NP , problem remains
one of the great open problems in theoretical computer science.
The computational complexity of finding the optimum solution, i.e. the
peak, in an NK landscape has been analyzed in the literature by (?) and (8).
In any case the proofs developed depends on the structure of interrelation-
ships. The main results can be summarized in the following four theorems,
Theorem 1 (Weinberger). The NK optimization problem with adjacent neigh-
borhoods is solvable in O
¡
2KN
¢
steps, and is thus in P .
Theorem 2 (Weinberger). The NK optimization problem with random neigh-
borhoods is NP complete for K ≥ 3.
Theorem 3 (Thompson and Wright). The NK optimization problem with
random K = 1 neighborhoods is solvable in polynomial time.
Theorem 4 (Thompson and Wright). The NK optimization problem with
random K = 2 is NP complete. Moreover, for a generalized K = 1 map with
no requirement that mii = 19 for all i the NK optimization problem is NP
complete.
Under the hypothesis that system try to simplify the level of complexity,
in order to obtain optimal values with less resources, the expected results as
9This requirement is equivalent to ask that department of firms includ themselve when
they compute the contribution to the firm.
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consequences of the model, is that the selected schools in Σ∗ will be the ones
that recommend structures with adjacent neighborhoods. The idea is that NK
landscapes with an adjacent structure produce P problems, which are simple
to solve.
SIMULATIONS
The iterative model proposed is explored through computer simulations10.
Every simulation has the following parameters; the populations are |Σ| = N
and |S| = 2N.
Once a firm has a recommendation it applies the evolutive operators during
τ = 200 periods in the search for optimal values in the reality Ω. On the other
hand schools apply their evolutive operators during T = 100 periods.
The parameters of the genetic operators are the same for firms and schools11.
The mutation rate is 0.001 and in every period 30% of the population is selected
applying the roulette algorithm.
Monte Carlo experiments were ran for N = {10, 12, 14, 16, 18, 20}. For each
value of N, 3 diﬀerent realities Ω were generated, and keeping the same reality
10 simulations were run.
10The code is in Matlab and the code of the program is available by request.
11This parameters are the values where the evolutionary operators applied to NK models
produce the best search.
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Analysis
The focus of the analysis is the set of recommendations Σ∗ that remain at
the end of the whole evolutionary process. Thus, in order to analyze this set
for every recommendation σ ∈ Σ∗ three indexes are computed.
1. The mean level of links K that represent how tight are the departments
between them. This index is computed according to
K =
1
N
NX
i=1
|σi|
where |σi| represent the number of links from i to other departments
that the recommendation σ proposes. The minimum number that |σi|
can assume is 1 because every department is linked to itself. On the
other hand N is the maximum number of departments in a firm. Thus
this index varies in the range 1 ≤ K ≤ N.
2. In order to capture how important is the variation within a recommen-
dation for every department the coeﬃcient of variation is computed as
v =
vuut 1
N
NX
i=1
¡
K − |σi|
¢2
K
3. The index of adjacency ϕ related to every recommendation gives infor-
mation about the level of adjacency among the departments in every
recommendation and it is computed as follows. Given that the recom-
mendation σi to a department i is represented as a binary string, any
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department included i, can have zero, one or two adjacent departments.
Thus, the maximum number of adjacencies that can be present in a rec-
ommendation σi is given by
J∗i =
⎧
⎨
⎩
2 (eσid− 1) if eσid < N
2 eσid if eσid = N
where eσid represents the number of ones that the recommendation to
the department i has. Thus, the mean index of adjacency of the recom-
mendation σ is computed as12
ϕ =
1
N
NX
i=1
Ji
J∗i
where J∗i is the maximum number of adjacencies and Ji is the actual
number of adjacencies in σi.
For the sake of exposition the index of adjacency will be partially computed
for one department. Suppose that the recommendation of the department 4 is
σ4 = {1, 0, 1, 1, 0}, where N = 5. In this case J∗4 = 4 and J4 = 2. Notice that
department 1 does not have adjacencies. Department 3 and 4 have one each.
Simulation Results
The mean of each of the three indexes over the 30 simulations are shown in
Table 1 for every value of N.
The results obtained from the Monte Carlo experiments show two character-
istics; first the result reinforce the prediction made about the complexity that
12 In the case where |σi| = 1 the departamental adjacency is equal to 1.
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N K v ϕ
10 9.9 0.01 1
12 11.9 0.02 1
14 14 0 1
16 15.6 0.03 1
18 17.9 0.01 1
20 19.8 0.02 1
Table 1. Mean results of the simulations
the schools in Σ∗ would recommend to the firms. Indeed the index of adjacency
shows that in any case the model selected is the adjacent one which represents
a P problem. However, on the other hand, schools that succeed recommend
to the firms the maximum degree of freedom that they could propose, which
means that the level of interaction within a firm is maximum. This means that
the schools recommend to the firms the most rugged landscape.
In other word, schools that survive are the one that leave the firms to do what
they want to do. Indeed given that both algorithms have the same abilities to
search, the coordination problem between schools and firms seems to introduce
unnecessary noise in the search process. Thus, the best strategy that emerge
is the one in which one of the algorithms becomes inactive and the other does
its best.
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CONCLUSIONS
The aim of this paper is to use a simple framework where problems with
diﬀerent levels of complexity can be selected to test which of this levels is
chosen by agents using evolutionary features.
The simple framework is the Kauﬀman NK model; the level of complexity
is given by the selection of the value of K and the structure of adjacency and
the agents are represented by firms that select diﬀerent recommendations, i.e.
level of complexity, from schools. Firms and schools use evolutionary operators
to search in their representation of reality.
The main result coming from the simulations shows that given that a search
process is carried on by two algorithms with the same abilities to search, the
coordination problem between both algorithms introduces unnecessary noise
in the search process. Thus, the best strategy is that one of the algorithms
become inactive such that the other can make its best.
On the other hand, this strategy of coordination between firms and school
produces, in the framework of NK models the selection of rugged landscapes.
This in turn, gives place to the existence of many firms using diﬀerent strategies
in the economy, because rugged landscape have many local optima, and firms
will cluster around these local optima in their search for the highest peak.
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